In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Metaphysical Musicians E. W. Van Steenburgh Having argued to the possible existence ofmathematical points, Hume concedes that checking for their actual existence is difficult because of the minuteness. He writes: the points, which enter into the composition of any line or surface, whether perceiv'd by the sight or touch, are so minute and soconfoundedwith eachother, that'tis utterly impossible for the mind to compute their number.1 He concludesthat (...) theirminutenessrenderspoints uselessforpurposes ofmeasurement. "We are sensible, that the addition or removal ofone of these minute parts, is not discernible either in the appearance or measuring" (T 48). This objection to his points leads Hume to view measuring, not in terms ofpoints, but asjuxtaposition ofobjects one to another or to a common measure, correcting apparent equality by art and instruments. And, he argues, correcting comes to an end when one runs out of art and instruments, although correcting, once set in motion, may go on at the level offancying after art and instruments have announced an end to it. This holds true not only for equality of quantities but of qualities as well. A musician finding his ear become every day more delicate, and correcting himself by reflection and attention, proceeds with the same act ofthe mind, even when the subject failshim, and entertains a notion ofa compleat tierce or octave, without being able to tell whence he derives his standard. (T 48-49) The metaphysical musician, according to Hume, is unable "to tell whence he derives his standard." This objection by Hume looks like it ismissingthe mark. The metaphysical musician could tell from whence he derives his standard. It is derived from sensible appearances. It is derived from the undifferentiated case which, to ears subsequently more discriminating, turns out to be two different notes, not one. The source ofthe standard is specified. What, then, does Hume mean when he states that metaphysical musicians cannot tell us from whence they derive their standard? An apparent standard, if it functions as a standard, has objects forits terms. For the standard is neither equality Volume XVIII Number 2 151 E. W. VAN STEENBURGH itself, whatever that might mean, nor an object; rather, the standard is "being equal to this object," whatever the object might be—in this case a musical note. In other words, an unspecified standard—a standard that is neither this nor that—is not a standard. It becomes a standardifand only ifit is specified for some object. The question now shifts to the object without which no standard is specified. It could be actual. It could be imaginary. Either way, it is an object. Yet, the metaphysical musicians rules that no object satisfies the standard. The outcome is contradiction. If you don't specify the standard, you don't have a standard; and ifyou do, you contradict the ruling that no object satisfies the standard. Hume does not explicitly allege contradiction. However, the other sideofthecontradictioncoin is an unspecifiedstandard. AndthisHume does allege. Hume sometimes does speak as ifan imagined musical note—the object in this case—is itselfa note. He speaks this way out ofdeference to his general theory of ideas as copies of impressions. However, the claim to contradiction, to incomprehensibility, does not depend on Hume's special doctrine of ideas copying impressions. For when we imagine objects, the objects we imagine, if we are consistent, are possible objects. So what we are saying, ifwe say that we can imagine equal objects is this: equal objects are impossible. Either, then, the metaphysical musician's imaginary correction, the imaginary trek toward absolute equahty, is incomprehensible because there is no standard—no objects—by which "correction"makes sense; orelse there is such a standard—object equality is possible—and the general rule that object equality is impossible is contradicted. Suppose we downgrade the a priori necessary rule to a contingent generalization about ordinary objects. Now it is not impossible, only unlikely, that one will find equal actual objects. Given a candidate for prototypicality, one imagines that one is mistaken, that the objects one thinks are equal are not, after all, equal, and soon. Here the only equal objects are always possible objects, never actual ones. One simply refuses to use... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:139. COULD AN IMPRESSION BE A PROCESS? Processes are of two main kinds, depending on whether the process has or lacks culmination. I am concerned with non-culminating processes, e.g., with a burning fuse sans explosion. This is reported as secondary by any good dictionary, derived from the head, or culminating, sense of 'process'. An ontological criterion for 'process' is as follows: something is absolutely unchanging, if it is unchanging (...) in every sense of the word. Those who hold that, e.g., a monotonous sound is absolutely unchanging hold that in an absolutely unchanging universe there is no reason why there should not be such a sound. Like any absolutely unchanging existent, a sound is caught, so to speak, in an instantaneous freeze on all change. Those who opt for process hold that change is, so to speak, of its essence. Hence, in an absolutely unchanging world, there could not be a process. The question I wish to raise is not whether there are processes, and certainly not whether Hume opts for processes. It is doubtful that Hume entertained the question of process. Indeed, that is the point. One of Hume's main commentators, R. W. Church, holds that Hume's perceptual atoms, defined by his dictum that distinguishability mutually entails separability, as well as their philosophical relations, are incompatible with the thesis that "experiences exist not in succession but in process." Church goes on to say that it is "difficult to see how... 'process' can have meaning for Hume. He plainly holds perceptions and their contents to be successive merely. I begin by considering Church's reason why Hume must reject processes, and then consider an additional reason drawn from Hume's account of time. Specifically, 140. divisibility òf time terminates in unchanging atoms. The essence of process is change. Hence, no temporal atom is a process. Neither reason, I argue, suffices for holding that impressions and processes are mutually exclusive. Hume holds that distinguishability mutually entails separability. Church holds that this dictum defines Hume's perceptual atomism. To highlight the atomism it is supposed to define, he rewords it, as follows: "Whatever is distinguishable is intrinsically self-identical and therefore self-contained." What does this rewording mean? According to Church, Hume, in the body of the Treatise, holds that resemblance is qualitative identity distributed, numerically, over many complexes. "On Hume's theory of abstract ideas, 'resemblance' is a verbal term referring (in virtue of habits of association) to any case of a qualitative 4 identity numerically distributed." Further, the qualitative identity in question is not relative to any difference from another quality, Bradley to the contrary notwithstanding. Difference, for Hume, is incompatible with relation and it is itself not a relation. It follows, according to Church, that Hume's absolute self-identity mutually entails self -containment. So much for Church's version of Hume's perceptual atomism. Is it incompatible with process, as Church claims? A trombone's slide illustrates non-culminating process with succession. Let us use it as a basis for an account. A trombone's slide is unbroken not only qua sound but qua pitch. Nevertheless, it incorporates pitch multiplicity. By "successive merely" does Church mean that the transition from pitch to pitch must be broken, contrary to what is heard, and, for this reason, Hume cannot account for the slide qua process? If so, he is mistaken. 141. Distinguishability mutually entails separability for Hume, but this does not mean that the transition from pitch to pitch cannot be experienced as a slide. In fact, it is easy to show that a trombone's slide conforms to Hume's dictum, by reason of the just noticeable difference and Hume's philosophical relation of contiguity in time. We are dealing with three notions: first, distinction, and, in particular, how pitches in the slide are distinguished. Second, separability, and, in particular, how separation corresponding to distinction is guaranteed by the fact of process. Third, slide, and, in particular how Hume's philosophical relation of temporal contiguity, coupled with the just noticeable difference, guarantees phenomenal slide. I take up these three notions in the order mentioned. The distinction between two pitches in the trombone's slide is... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:61. HUME'S GEOMETRIC "OBJECTS" Arithmetic and algebra allow of precision and certainty. The science of geometry is not likewise a perfect and infallible science. At any rate, this is Hume's teaching in the Treatise. When two numbers are so combin ' d, as that the one has always an unite answering to every unite of the other, we pronounce them equal; and 'tis for want of such a standard (...) of equality in extension, that geometry can scarce be esteem'd a perfect and infallible science. 1 The ideas of, say, equality and right line shade into· inequality and curve. It must not be supposed, however, that the vagueness of these ideas renders all judgments uncertain and fallible. 'Tie evident, that the eye, or rather the mind is often able at one view to determine the proportions of bodies....Such judgments are not only common, but in many cases certain and infallible. (T47) Nevertheless, geometry is a fallible science because its essential ideas are vague. Vagueness, due to lack of boundaries between ideas, is in the ideas themselves. For this reason, 'tis impossible to produce any definition of them, which will fix the precise boundaries betwixt them. (T49) (Yet, some forty pages earlier Hume argued at length that the mind cannot form any notion of quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of the degrees of each [T18]) As far as the Treatise goes, geometry is the science of measurement and as such it must allow for error. Even if precise geometric standards could be had, they would not make the propositions of geometry certain. Thus, we might precisely define a right line by a rule of order of indivisible points. But geometry, construed as the science of measurement, would not be perfected. Nor, if it were (the standard), is there any such firmness in our senses or imagination, as to determine when such an order is violated or preserv ' d. The original standard of a right line is in reality nothing but a certain general appearance. (T52) 62. In the Enquiries, Hume continues to hold that notions essential to geometry, for example, equality, right line, and so on, are sensibles. But they are no longer generic appearances. They are determinate. The great advantage of the mathematical sciences above the moral consists in this, that the ideas of the former, being sensible, are always clear and determinate... even when no definition is employed, the object itself may be presented to the senses, and by that means be steadily and clearly apprehended. 2 In addition, geometry is no longer merely the science of measurement. The truths of Euclid, Hume holds, would remain truths even if there were no figures in nature. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence. (EHU25) Professor Zabeeh, in his commentary on Hume, holds that Hume did not mean to imply that Euclid could dispense with the observation of figures. However, whenever possible Hume should be taken at his word: observation of figures is not a truth condition for propositions of geometry. A distinction must be drawn between discovery conditions and what Hume calls the "truth or evidence" of a geometric proposition. We may suppose that observation of figures is a discovery condition. But it is hardly a truth condition. The certainty, as opposed to the discovery, of geometric propositions does not depend on the existence in nature of any figure. I am mainly concerned, however, with Professor Zabeeh' s account of how, according to Hume, geometric propositions retain their certainty and evidence in the face of recalcitrant experience. Noting that Hume does not "fully explain," he gives the real reason for Hume's belief in the apodeictic certainty of mathematical truths. He appears to assume we never allow such truths to be controverted by empirical evidence. That is to say, if perchance we find, by measurement, that the sum of the angles of a Euclidean triangle 63. does not equal 180 degrees, either we say that we measured wrongly or we say that the triangle we have been measuring is not Euclidean.4 This formulation of Hume's reason avoids... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:61. HUME'S GEOMETRIC "OBJECTS" Arithmetic and algebra allow of precision and certainty. The science of geometry is not likewise a perfect and infallible science. At any rate, this is Hume's teaching in the Treatise. When two numbers are so combin ' d, as that the one has always an unite answering to every unite of the other, we pronounce them equal; and 'tis for want of such a standard (...) of equality in extension, that geometry can scarce be esteem'd a perfect and infallible science. 1 The ideas of, say, equality and right line shade into· inequality and curve. It must not be supposed, however, that the vagueness of these ideas renders all judgments uncertain and fallible. 'Tie evident, that the eye, or rather the mind is often able at one view to determine the proportions of bodies....Such judgments are not only common, but in many cases certain and infallible. (T47) Nevertheless, geometry is a fallible science because its essential ideas are vague. Vagueness, due to lack of boundaries between ideas, is in the ideas themselves. For this reason, 'tis impossible to produce any definition of them, which will fix the precise boundaries betwixt them. (T49) (Yet, some forty pages earlier Hume argued at length that the mind cannot form any notion of quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of the degrees of each [T18]) As far as the Treatise goes, geometry is the science of measurement and as such it must allow for error. Even if precise geometric standards could be had, they would not make the propositions of geometry certain. Thus, we might precisely define a right line by a rule of order of indivisible points. But geometry, construed as the science of measurement, would not be perfected. Nor, if it were (the standard), is there any such firmness in our senses or imagination, as to determine when such an order is violated or preserv ' d. The original standard of a right line is in reality nothing but a certain general appearance. (T52) 62. In the Enquiries, Hume continues to hold that notions essential to geometry, for example, equality, right line, and so on, are sensibles. But they are no longer generic appearances. They are determinate. The great advantage of the mathematical sciences above the moral consists in this, that the ideas of the former, being sensible, are always clear and determinate... even when no definition is employed, the object itself may be presented to the senses, and by that means be steadily and clearly apprehended. 2 In addition, geometry is no longer merely the science of measurement. The truths of Euclid, Hume holds, would remain truths even if there were no figures in nature. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence. (EHU25) Professor Zabeeh, in his commentary on Hume, holds that Hume did not mean to imply that Euclid could dispense with the observation of figures. However, whenever possible Hume should be taken at his word: observation of figures is not a truth condition for propositions of geometry. A distinction must be drawn between discovery conditions and what Hume calls the "truth or evidence" of a geometric proposition. We may suppose that observation of figures is a discovery condition. But it is hardly a truth condition. The certainty, as opposed to the discovery, of geometric propositions does not depend on the existence in nature of any figure. I am mainly concerned, however, with Professor Zabeeh' s account of how, according to Hume, geometric propositions retain their certainty and evidence in the face of recalcitrant experience. Noting that Hume does not "fully explain," he gives the real reason for Hume's belief in the apodeictic certainty of mathematical truths. He appears to assume we never allow such truths to be controverted by empirical evidence. That is to say, if perchance we find, by measurement, that the sum of the angles of a Euclidean triangle 63. does not equal 180 degrees, either we say that we measured wrongly or we say that the triangle we have been measuring is not Euclidean.4 This formulation of Hume's reason avoids... (shrink)

Blackshaw and Hendricks have recently developed and defended the impairment argument against abortion, arguing that the immorality of giving a child fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) provides us with reason to believe that abortion is immoral. In this paper, we forward two criticisms of the impairment argument. First, we highlight that, as it currently stands, the argument is very weak and accomplishes very little. Second, we argue that Blackshaw and Hendricks are fundamentally mistaken about what makes giving a child FAS immoral. (...) Once we acknowledge this, it is clear that our intuitions about giving a child FAS provide no support for the supposed immorality of abortion. (shrink)

Metaphysicians speak of laws of nature in terms of necessity and universality; scientists, in terms of symmetry and invariance. In this book van Fraassen argues that no metaphysical account of laws can succeed. He analyzes and rejects the arguments that there are laws of nature, or that we must believe there are, and argues that we should disregard the idea of law as an adequate clue to science. After exploring what this means for general epistemology, the author develops the empiricist (...) view of science as a construction of models to represent the phenomena. (shrink)

What is empiricism and what could it be? Bas . van Fraassen, one of the world’s foremost contributors to philosophical logic and the philosophy of science, here undertakes a fresh consideration of these questions and offers a program for renewal of the empiricist tradition. The empiricist tradition is not and could not be defined by common doctrines, but embodies a certain stance in philosophy, van Fraassen says. This stance is displayed first of all in a searing, recurrent critique of metaphysics, (...) and secondly in a focus on experience that requires a voluntarist view of belief and opinion. Van Fraassen focuses on the philosophical problems of scientific and conceptual revolutions and on the not unrelated ruptures between religious and secular ways of seeing or conceiving of ourselves. He explores what it is to be or not be secular and points the way toward a new relationship between secularism and science within philosophy. (shrink)

What is empiricism and what could it be? Bas C. van Fraassen, one of the world’s foremost contributors to philosophical logic and the philosophy of science, here undertakes a fresh consideration of these questions and offers a program for renewal of the empiricist tradition. The empiricist tradition is not and could not be defined by common doctrines, but embodies a certain stance in philosophy, van Fraassen says. This stance is displayed first of all in a searing, recurrent critique of metaphysics, (...) and second in a focus on experience that requires a voluntarist view of belief and opinion._ _Van Fraassen focuses on the philosophical problems of scientific and conceptual revolutions and on the not unrelated ruptures between religious and secular ways of seeing or conceiving of ourselves. He explores what it is to be or not be secular and points the way toward a new relationship between secularism and science within philosophy. (shrink)

The fundamental texts of the great classical period in modern logic, some of them never before available in English translation, are here gathered together for ...

This essay argues that there are theoretical benefits to keeping distinct—more pervasively than the literature has done so far—the psychological states of imagining that p versus believing that in-the-story p, when it comes to cognition of fiction and other forms of narrative. Positing both in the minds of a story’s audience helps explain the full range of reactions characteristic of story consumption. This distinction also has interesting conceptual and explanatory dimensions that haven’t been carefully observed, and the two mental state (...) types make distinct contributions to generating emotional responses to stories. Finally, the differences between the mental states illuminate how a given story can be both shared with others and at the same time experienced as personal. (shrink)

Organizations such as the EU High-Level Expert Group on AI and the IEEE have recently formulated ethical principles and (moral) values that should be adhered to in the design and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI). These include respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, fairness, transparency, explainability, and accountability. But how can we ensure and verify that an AI system actually respects these values? To help answer this question, I propose an account for determining when an AI system can be said to embody (...) certain values. This account understands embodied values as the result of design activities intended to embed those values in such systems. AI systems are here understood as a special kind of sociotechnical system that, like traditional sociotechnical systems, are composed of technical artifacts, human agents, and institutions but—in addition—contain artificial agents and certain technical norms that regulate interactions between artificial agents and other elements of the system. The specific challenges and opportunities of embedding values in AI systems are discussed, and some lessons for better embedding values in AI systems are drawn. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn The Netherlands, the public funding of a number of health care services is controversial. What can we learn from this about the moral concerns that underlie these judgements? And, if there is anything to learn, can we use this improved understanding to scrutinise the adequacy of particular decisions concerning the public funding of health care services? In the present paper, I will analyse three cases: corrective surgey, In Vitro Fertilisation and liver transplantation. I will summarise the arguments that have (...) been used to support or to challenge the public funding of these services. I will then assess the merits of Daniels’fair equality of opportunity account of justice in health care. Can this account improve our understanding of the moral concerns underlying our judgements about the public funding of these services? Can it serve to scrutinise the adequacy of particular decisions that are made concerning the public funding of health care services? My answer to both questions will be a qualified yes. Daniels’account can provide guidance, but not because we can deductively infer from it what is right and what is wrong. Instead, I will argue for a more casuistic use of the concept of fair equality of opportunity. (shrink)

Bryan W. Van Norden lambastes academic philosophy for its Eurocentrism and insularity and challenges educational institutions to live up to their cosmopolitan ideals. Taking Back Philosophy is at once a manifesto for multicultural education, an accessible introduction to Confucian and Buddhist philosophy, and a defense of the value of philosophy.

Metaethics: A Contemporary Introduction provides a solid foundation in metaethics for advanced undergraduates by introducing a series of puzzles that most metaethical theories address. These puzzles involve moral disagreement, reference, moral epistemology, metaphysics, and moral psychology. From there, author Mark van Roojen discusses the many positions in metaethics that people will take in reaction to these puzzles. Van Roojen asks several essential questions of his readers, namely: What is metaethics? Why study it? How does one discuss metaethics, given its inherently (...) controversial nature? Each chapter closes with questions, both for reading comprehension and further discussion, and annotated suggestions for further reading. (shrink)

This text gives examples of how a different kind of human experience may be explored, and how the methods used for investigating phenomena may contribute to the process of human understanding.

This book develops a view of logic as a theory of information-driven agency and intelligent interaction between many agents - with conversation, argumentation and games as guiding examples. It provides one uniform account of dynamic logics for acts of inference, observation, questions and communication, that can handle both update of knowledge and revision of beliefs. It then extends the dynamic style of analysis to include changing preferences and goals, temporal processes, group action and strategic interaction in games. Throughout, the book (...) develops a mathematical theory unifying all these systems, and positioning them at the interface of logic, philosophy, computer science and game theory. A series of further chapters explores repercussions of the 'dynamic stance' for these areas, as well as cognitive science. (shrink)

This paper explains a fallacy that often arises in theorizing about human minds. I call it the Factual Belief Fallacy. The Fallacy, roughly, involves drawing conclusions about human psychology that improperly ignore the large backgrounds of mostly accurate factual beliefs people have. The Factual Belief Fallacy has led to significant mistakes in both philosophy of mind and cognitive science of religion. Avoiding it helps us better see the difference between factual belief and religious credence; seeing that difference in turn enables (...) us to pose interesting normative questions about various mental states labeled “belief.”. (shrink)

This book gathers together thirteen of Peter van Inwagen's essays on metaphysics, several of which have acquired the status of modern classics in their field. They range widely across such topics as Quine's philosophy of quantification, the ontology of fiction, the part-whole relation, the theory of 'temporal parts', and human knowledge of modal truths. In addition, van Inwagen considers the question as to whether the psychological continuity theory of personal identity is compatible with materialism, and defends the thesis that possible (...) states of affairs are abstract objects, in opposition to David Lewis's 'extreme modal realism'. A specially-written introduction completes the collection, which will be an invaluable resource for anyone interested in metaphysics. (shrink)

How are we to appraise new technological developments that may bring revolutionary social changes? Currently this is often done by trying to predict or anticipate social consequences and to use these as a basis for moral and regulatory appraisal. Such an approach can, however, not deal with the uncertainties and unknowns that are inherent in social changes induced by technological development. An alternative approach is proposed that conceives of the introduction of new technologies into society as a social experiment. An (...) ethical framework for the acceptability of such experiments is developed based on the bioethical principles for experiments with human subjects: non-maleficence, beneficence, respect for autonomy, and justice. This provides a handle for the moral and regulatory assessment of new technologies and their impact on society. (shrink)

In het kader van de Leerstoel Rector Dhanis (UFSIA, Antwerpen) werd door een studiegroep bestaande uit artsen en verpleegkundigen, ethici en juristen, een interdisciplinaire studie ondernomen over 'klinische ethiek' en 'hoe recht en politiek omgaan met problemen die thuishoren in de klinische praktijk'. In deze bundel wordt het ethische denken in een aantal casussen betreffende neonatalen en dementerenden kritisch besproken. De adviezen van het Raadgevend Comite voor Bio-Ethiek over sterilisatie van mentaal gehandicapten en over klonering worden onderzocht op hun relevantie (...) voor de klinische praktijk. (shrink)

In a book that will appeal to a general audience as well as philosophers of religion, a leading metaphysician tackles fundamental theological problems in a lucid and engaging manner. Peter van Inwagen begins with a provocative new introduction exploring the question of whether a philosopher such as himself is qualified to address theological matters. The chapters that follow take up the central problem of evil in a world created and sustained by God.

A speaker's use of a declarative sentence in a context has two effects: it expresses a proposition and represents the speaker as knowing that proposition. This essay is about how to explain the second effect. The standard explanation is act-based. A speaker is represented as knowing because their use of the declarative in a context tokens the act-type of assertion and assertions represent knowledge in what's asserted. I propose a semantic explanation on which declaratives covertly host a "know"-parenthetical. A speaker (...) is thereby represented as knowing the proposition expressed because that is the semantic contribution of the parenthetical. I call this view parentheticalism and defend that it better explains knowledge representation than alternatives. As a consequence of outperforming assertoric explanations, parentheticalism opens the door to eliminating the act-type of assertion from linguistic theorizing. (shrink)